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MAKING AND DEFENDING TORT CLAIMS
Karen J. Kruger
INTRODUCTION
Tort suits that involve the government as a party necessarily require the advocates 
to consider the impact of sovereign immunity on the litigation.1  For practitioners who 
represent governmental entities and employees as defendants, sovereign immunity is an 
important defense, as it can serve to deprive a court of jurisdiction and completely deter a 
lawsuit.  Those who seek to sue the government must have a command of the waivers of 
sovereign immunity for which the law provides and be aware of the procedural 
requirements that often accompany those waivers in order for a suit to even be filed.  
Maryland appellate courts have explained that the Maryland doctrine of sovereign 
or governmental immunity “has survived repeated challenges over the years and remains 
a formidable obstacle to those who attempt to sue a governmental entity,”2 and that the 
immunity is “deeply ingrained in Maryland law.”3 The Court of Appeals described 
sovereign immunity as “[o]nce venerated, recently vilified, and presently substantially 
limited, [it] has long been recognized by this Court.  We have applied the doctrine for 
1
 This Article does not address the questions of governmental immunity, or lack thereof, in contract actions. 
Some resources for practitioners to consult with respect to contract claims include: Harold J. Krent, 
Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1560-78 (1992); ARA Health Servs., Inc. 
v. Dept. of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 344 Md. 85, 95 (1996) (waiving, to a limited extent, 
State sovereign immunity in contract actions); MD CODE  ANN., State Gov’t §12-201 (2004 Repl. Vol.) 
(barring use of sovereign immunity defense in contract actions); Harford County v. Bel Air, 348 Md. 363, 
372-373 (1998);  Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Commission v. Kranz, 308 Md. 618 (1987) 
(rejecting immunity in contract actions for counties and municipalities ); MD CODE  ANN., Art. 25B, §13A 
(1997) (barring the defense by Maryland counties  for certain actions).
2 Heffner v. Montgomery Co., 76 Md. App. 328, 333 (1988).
3
 Nam v. Montgomery Co., 127 Md. App. 172, 182 (1999).
3over a century….”4 Indeed, one of the earliest Maryland cases involving questions of 
sovereign immunity was decided over a century ago,5 and as rec ently as during its 
September 2005 term, the Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari in yet another 
case raising questions of governmental immunity.6
This Article is a resource for practitioners in Maryland to consult when facing 
litigation in which the doctrine of sovereign immunity is an issue.  It highlights the key 
features of the variations in the law of sovereign immunity and governmental waivers,
with the goal of creating starting point for litigants and their attorneys.  This Article is not 
intended to be a complete treatise on the law of sovereign immunity in Maryland, but 
rather a practical resource to provide practitioners familiarity with the issue.
My own experience as a government attorney has shown that Maryland litigators 
struggle with the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the 
various statutory and jurisprudential exceptions to this immunity that relate the  civil 
liability of the government and its employees. The nature of the immunity and the 
conditions of waiver vary depending on which government is being subjected to suit (i.e., 
federal, State,7 or local), with further variations dependent on the character of the causes 
of action.  The competent litigator must fully explore these issues before filing or 
defending a suit, or she risks  losing a claim or defense.  
Part I of this Article provides a general overview of the historical foundations of 
the common law concept of sovereign immunity. The skilled practitioner should 
4 Austin v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 53 (1979).
5 State v. B & O Rail. Co., 34 Md. 344 (1871), aff’d sub nom B & O Rail. Co. v. Maryland  88 U.S. (21 
Wall.) 456 (1875).
6 Whalen v. May & City Council of Baltimore, 164 Md. App. 292, cert. granted  390 Md. 284 (Dec 19, 
2005).
7
  In this Article, the term “State” refers to the State of Maryland. 
4understand these concepts in order to apply the relevant legal principles and create new 
approaches to litigation that involves sovereign immunity to best serve their clients’ 
interest.  Part II describes governmental waivers of sovereign immunity; those waivers 
are limited and their nature differs with the type of government or agency involved.  This 
section is divided first by way of the common governmental hierarchy: federal, State, and 
municipal or local.  In a second sub-section, the Article discusses other “cross over” 
doctrinal and practical matters that come into play—again depending on the type of cause 
of action and the identity of the defendant(s).       
PART I – SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY,
A BRIEF HISTORY
Sovereign immunity is the legal construct that provides immunity to a 
government, protecting it from private lawsuits in tort.  Although the general principle of 
sovereign immunity is well-known, its origins and bases in the law are obscure.8 Scholars 
have examined sovereign immunity for centuries, 9 and although as a theoretical legal 
construct its historical foundation is weak, sovereign immunity’s role in contemporary 
jurisprudence remains strong.
8
 Thomas A. Bowden, Sovereign Immunity from Statutes of Limitation in Maryland, 46 MD.  L. REV. 408, 
409 (1987).
9 See e.g.,WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Book I, ch. 7 (1765); 1 
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (1898); L. Ehrlich, Proceedings Against the 
Crown, 6 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY (1921); William. Holdsworth, The History of 
Remedies Against the Crown, 38 L.Q. REV. 141 (1922); Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 
34 YALE L. J. 1 (1924); Leon Thomas Davis, The Tort Liability of Public Officers – Part II, 12 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 260, 283 (1930); F. James, Jr., Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 610 (1955);  Kenneth Culp Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. REV. 751 
(1956); L. Jaffee, Suits Against the Government and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. LAW REV. 1 
(1963); Daniel C. Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United States 1790-1950, 
1966 U. ILL. LAW F. 795 (Winter 1964); David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive 
Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972-73); Kenneth Culp Davis, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 4-
14 (1984); Jack Boger, Mark Gittenstein and Paul R. Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional 
Torts Amendment: An Interpretative Analysis, 54 N. C. LAW REV. 497, 507–10 (1976).
5Although sovereign immunity may have some origin in Roman law,10 it was 
certainly a part of early English common law as well, evidenced by a commonly held 
belief that “the Crown can do no wrong.”11  This rationale was based on the idea that 
monarchs were chosen and guided by divine providence, and thus did not commit 
misdeeds.12  For a subject to accuse the Sovereign of illegal acts would have been 
contrary to God’s will, so the Sovereign enjoyed complete immunity.13
Over time, the feudal idea that a king could not be sued in the courts that he 
himself created14 gave way to the notion that the King was subject to the law, and that 
“the King was not only capable of, but disposed toward doing wrong.”15 Indeed, some 
scholars have interpreted the expression “the King can do no wrong” to actually mean 
that the “the King must not, was not allowed, not entitled to do wrong.” 16 Thus, 
medieval Englishmen recognized that the King did commit wrongs, even if he could not 
be sued in his own courts without his consent.  They sought redress from the Crown 
through “petitions of right,” and gradually a principle arose that “the King could not 
rightfully refuse petitions of right.”17
By the eighteenth century, evolving notions of the Monarchy set jurisprudential 
scholars to the task of defining the changing nature of sovereign immunity.  William 
10 Robert Dorsey Watkins, THE STATE AS A PARTY LITIGANT 2 (1927); Davis, supra note 9 at 5.
11




 Bowden, supra note 8, at 410.
14
 Engdahl, supra note 9, at 3.
15 Id. 
16 Id., note 7 at 3,
17 Id. (distinguishing petitions of right from “mere petitions of grace.”)
6Blackstone was the best known of these commentators, and “was widely read in America 
both before and after the Revolution.”18  Even modern American case law continues to 
cite Blackstone’s Commentaries,19 published in 1765.  Of course, one of the key premises 
of the American revolution was the colonists’ rejection of the Monarchy,20 and how 
monarchical sovereign immunity transformed into American governmental immunity has 
been called “one of the great mysteries of legal evolution.”21
The solution to the mystery may be found in the fact that the American States 
were deeply in debt as a result of the Revolutionary war, thus creating a “good practical 
reason to assume the doctrine’s applicability without too much attention to whether it fit 
the new polity, and most men who thought of the matter at all were not doubt thus 
dissuaded from questioning its validity.”22
The 1787 Constitution created a federal judiciary and a jurisdiction that did not 
make any exception for cases in which the defendant was either a state or the Union 
itself.23 In 1793, the United State Supreme Court considered whether a State could be 
sued without its consent.  In Chisholm v. Georgia,24 four of the five justices found that a 
state was subject to federal court jurisdiction under the Constitution when being sued by 
citizens of another state, whether or not the state had consented to suit.25
18 Id., at 4.
19 Godwin v. County Comm’rs, 256 Md. 326, 330-31 (1970) (quoting BROWNE’S BLACKSTONE 
COMMENTARIES, at 11 (1941)).
20 The National Association of Attorneys General, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT 
AND ITS OFFICIALS, 1 (1976) [hereinafter NAAG]. 
21
 Borchard, supra note 9, at 4, but see Davis, supra note 9, at 5 (stating that “The sole basis for immunity 
of the American democracy from tort liability has been Blackstone’s 1756 proposition: ‘The king can do no 
wrong….’”).
22
 Engdahl, supra note 9, at 6. (noting  also the limited exception to the doctrine found in the Articles of 
Confederation for a special federal tribunal to settle inter-state disputes).
23 Id., citing U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
24
 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
25
 Engdahl, supra  note 9 at 7.
7Although the decision represented a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution26
in finding that it  contained no explicit grant of sovereign immunity, the holding caused 
great turmoil among the states.  States were suddenly faced with fear that they could be 
exposed to suits arising from debts incurred during the Revolutionary War, obligations 
that they could not possibly meet.27  In response, Congress passed the Eleventh 
Amendment in 1789.28
In Cohens v. Virginia,29 Chief Justice Marshall wrote that “[t]he universally 
received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United 
States.”30  In 1882, the Court acknowledged that “while the exemption of the United 
States and of the several states from being subjected as defendants to ordinary actions in 
the courts…has been repeatedly asserted here, the principle has never been discussed of 
the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established doctrine.”31
In The Siren,32 the Court endeavored to justify the doctrine when it said: “It is 
obvious that the public service would be hindered and the public safety endangered, if the 
supreme authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen, and 
consequently controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the proper 
26
 Curiously, in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946), Justice 
Frankfurter mistakenly opined that “[sovereign] immunity from suit is embodied in the Constitution.”
27 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821).
28
 The Eleventh Amendment reads, in relevant part: “The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
States were empowered to preserve sovereign immunity and escape suit in its own courts without 
its consent, and notions of comity and sovereignty saved each state form being subject to judgments 
rendered by courts in another state. Engdahl, supra note 9, at 8.
29
 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)
30 Id. at 411-12; See also Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850).
31 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882).
32
 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868).
8administration of the government.”33 States, too, invoked the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity with little additional justification.34
In 1907, Justice Holmes noted that “[s]ome doubts have been expressed as to the 
source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission….A 
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, 
but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the 
authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”35
Given that sovereign immunity is common law, courts have the power to change 
it.  While some state courts have taken such initiative, no federal courts have done so.36
And although the doctrine has been criticized,37 it has not been totally abrogated either by 
judicial action or by statue.  Indeed, some degree of immunity for the government may be 
necessary to “maintain a proper balance among the branches of the federal 
government…[and] to preserv[e] majoritarian  policymaking and not from the need to 
honor any hoary traditions.”38
33 Id. at 154;  See also Nicholas v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122 (1869) (stating that the “principle is 
fundamental, applies to every sovereign power, and but for the protection it affords, the government would 
be unable to perform the varied duties for which it was created”);  Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) 
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state by citizens of its own, unless the state has 
consented thereto; sovereign immunity was already an established legal principle at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution.)
34
 Although the States surrendered some independence and sovereignty to the federal union under the 
Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2, they did retain sovereignty within their own borders.  The 
Eleventh Amendment was an attempt to define the limits of federal judicial power over the states. See 
Linda S. Mullenix, Martin Radish & Georgene Vairo, UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL COURTS & JURISDICTION
488 (1998); Kramer, supra note 9; Black v. Republican, 1 Yeates 139 (Pa. 1792); Commonwealth v. 
Coquhouns,  2  Hen. & M.  213 (Va. 1808).  
The first recorded case examining whether municipalities have the privilege of sovereign 
immunity held that it does not. Lobdell v. Inhabitants of New Bedford, 1 Mass. 153 (1804).  However, 
eight years later, the Court reversed itself.  Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 246  (1812). 
35 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank  205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
36
 Davis, supra  note 9, at 7–8 (noting that by 1976, 29 state courts “had abolished chunks of sovereign 
immunity” and that 34 states have enacted statutes affecting the immunity).
37 Id.; Krent, supra note 1, at 1530-31.
38
 Krent, supra note 1, at 1531–33.
9Whatever the justification for sovereign immunity, it has deep, if not dense, 
historical roots and is an established part of the American governmental system.  The 
states were the first to enjoy the protection, then the federal government, and finally the 
municipal levels of government. Immunity has even extended to certain governmental 
officials.39  Federal40 and State41 legislators, and all judges42 have absolute and 
unqualified immunity, regardless of the nature of their conduct.  Quasi-judicial officials, 
such as prosecuting attorneys, have absolute immunity for their initiation of a 
presentation of criminal cases.43  Other government officials have been granted
immunity, either by statute or through common law;44 to the extent that those immunities 
apply in Maryland, they are addressed in the subsequent sections of this Article. 
The immunity enjoyed by governments, their agencies and their employees 
derives from historical sovereign immunity, and is now most often referred to as 
“governmental immunity.”45 “Maryland imported its concept of governmental 
immunity”46 which bars tort litigation against a sovereign, from this historical foundation.  
The legal principle is “alive and well in Maryland today,”47 but does not apply equally to 
all governmental units.  While the State itself maintains “near-complete immunity from 
39
 NAAG, supra note 20, at 9.
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
41 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); See also Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 221 (1979) 
(extending immunity to Maryland Delegates) .
42 Wood  at 316; Pierson v. Ray, 396 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1967).
43 Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). However, prosecutors MAY have only qualified 
immunity for acts committed when acting in the role of a criminal investigator or administrator.  See 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521 (1985).  
44
 NAAG, supra note 20, at 11-12.
45 See Kranz, 308 Md. at 625 (noting that traditionally the State’s immunity was referred to as “sovereign 
immunity” while that attached to municipalities was called governmental immunity, the semantic 
difference now being insignificant, and the terms now used interchangeably).
46 Heffner v. Montgomery County, 76 Md. App. 328, 332 (1987).
47 Id.
10
tort litigation…, municipalities and counties have a more limited immunity from such 
litigation.”48
These differences and distinctions in State law are discussed at length below, but 
now this Article turns its attention to the sovereign immunity of the federal government, 
and the legislative waiver of that immunity through the Federal Tort Claims Act, which 
later became the basis for a similar Maryland statute.
PART II – GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE
A. CONGRESSIONAL WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ON BEHALF OF THE 
UNITED STATES 
The History of the Federal Tort Claims Act
In 1855, Congress passed the Court of Claims Act,49 its first acknowledgement 
that absolutely barring suits against the federal government was impractical and perhaps 
unfair.  This Act made the government liable only on its contracts,50 despite Alexander 
Hamilton’s pronouncement nearly a century before that “Contracts between a Nation and 
individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign and….confer no right of 
action independent of the sovereign will.”51
Until 1946, the only way a citizen could make a claim in tort against the federal 
government was to file a private bill in Congress.52  But by enacting the Federal Tort 
48 Id.
49
 Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, §1, 10 Stat. 612.
50
 Davis, supra note 9, at 5; Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 274 (1868) (stating that the 
government must pay for what it agreed to purchase). 
51 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 at 488  (Alexander Hamilton).
52
 Frank Hanley Santoro, A Practical Guide to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 CONN. B. J. 224, 224 
(1989); Alexander Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal Government, 9 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 311 (1942); Note, Tort Claims Against the United States, 30 GEO. L. J. 462 (1942).
11
Claims Act (FTCA)53 Congress broadened the liability of the United States, permitting 
recovery for the negligent acts of federal employees.54 The concept underlying the statute 
is simple: the United States may be sued and is liable in the same way and to the same 
extent as a private individual under the same circumstances, in accordance with the law 
of the place in which the negligent or wrongful conduct by its agent occurred.55
In March 1974, Congress amended the FTCA56 in an important way.  The 
amendment, in effect, included within the coverage of the Act a group of intentional torts 
that were previously excluded. This action has been referred to as the “intentional torts 
amendment.”57  Contemporary events58 and the Supreme Court ruling in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,59 (in which the Court held 
that federal law enforcement officers could be sued under the Constitution itself, 
notwithstanding sovereign immunity), created the so-called “constitutional tort.”60  The 
Court ruled that claimants may file suits alleging such claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1331, which provides jurisdiction in all cases “arising under the Constitution or laws of 
the United States.”61
53
 28 U.S.C. §2671-2680 (2005). For comprehensive histories of the FTCA, the legislative birth of which 
began in the 1920’s, see Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 Yale L. J. 534 (1947).
54
 Boger et al., supra note 9, at 508-09.
55 FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE HANDBOOK, 2d ed..(chapter on legislative history of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act); see also Krent, supra note 1, at 1546 (stating that FTCA is predicated on State law.)
56
 28 U.S.C. §2680(h)(Supp. 1976), amending 28 U.S.C. §2680(h) (1970).
57
 Boger et al., supra note 9, at 498.
58 Id. 498-505 (discussing the federal government acts in quelling student riots at Jackson and Kent State 
Universities, the 1971 May Day mass arrests in Washington, D.C., the prisoner rebellion at Attica State 
Prison that same year, and an infamous 1973 narcotics raid in Collinsville, Illinois.)  
59
 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
60
 Boger et al., supra note 9,  at 510.
61
 28 U.S.C. §1331 (2005).
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The 1974 amendment affected section 2680(h) of the FTCA, the section that 
delineates the tort actions for which the United States has not waived immunity.62  Under 
the amendment, when “investigative or law enforcement officer of the United States 
government” commits one of the excepted torts, suits on this basis are permitted.63
In 1988, Congress again modified the FTCA to clarify that it is the exclusive 
remedy for common law torts committed by federal employees within the scope of their 
employment.  This amendment was a response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Westfall v. Erwin,64 ruling that dramatically expanded the personal tort liability of federal 
employees.  Through this amendment, Congress conferred absolute immunity on all 
governmental officials for common law torts committed within the scope of federal 
employment.65
Thus, the FTCA permits a citizen to bring a civil action against the United States 
for personal injury or property damage that was caused by the negligent or wrongful act 
or omission of a government employee, so long as the employee was acting within the 
62
 Generally speaking, §2680 lists the several  instances in which federal tort claims procedures  (i.e., Title 
28, ch. 171) do not apply.  28 U.S.C. §2680 (2005).  Subsection (h), as noted above, lists tort actions for 
which the United States has not waived immunity.  Prior to the 1974 amendment §2680(h) read as follows:
“(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.”
63
 The 1974 amendment to §2680(h) added the following proviso to the existing text:
“Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the 
United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346 (b) of this title shall apply 
to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution.
64
 484 U.S. 292 (1988) 
65
 Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (FELRTCA), PUB. L. NO. 100-
694, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 831(c)(2) (Supp. 1990).
13
scope of his employment.66 The employee is immune from suit. By virtue of the FTCA,
the government has effectively substituted itself as the potential defendant in tort suits.67
Under the Act, the term "Federal agency" includes the executive departments, the 
judicial and legislative branches, the military departments, independent establishments of 
the United States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of 
the United States, but does not include any contractor with the United States.68 An
"employee of the government" includes (1) officers or employees of any federal agency, 
members of the military or naval forces of the United States, members of the National 
Guard while engaged in training or duty under certain sections of Title 32 of the Code, 
and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or
permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or without compensation, 
and (2) any officer or employee of a Federal public defender organization, except when 
such officer or employee performs professional services in the course of providing 
representation under section 3006A of Title 18 of the Code.69
Procedural Requirements
Before filing suit, a claimant must file an administrative claim to the “responsible 
agency” within two years of the alleged injury.70  The claim must be for a specific 
compensatory amount and the claimant should also provide supporting documentation.71
66
 28 U.S.C. § 2671.
67
 FELRTCA made the FTCA the exclusive remedy for the common law torts committed by federal 
employees in the course of their employment.  Previously, the government was clearly liable under the 
FTCA but it was unclear whether the employee was also liable.  DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS, supra
note 9, at 23.
68
 28 U.S.C. § 2671.
69 Id.
70
 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
71
 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1988).  The amount of the claim cannot be increased when suit is filed unless new 
evidence has been discovered in the interim.  28 U.S.C.§ 2675(b).   
14
Many agencies have established rather elaborate procedures for the presentation, 
investigation and administrative disposition of tort claims, and thousands of claims are 
settled at the agency level.72
The agency has a minimum of six months in which to evaluate the claim for 
settlement; if the agency does not respond to the claim within that timeframe, the 
claimant may presume a denial and file suit.73  The Complaint must be filed in the United 
States District Court within six months of the denial, or the expiration of the denial 
period.74  Venue is proper either in the district in which the alleged injury occurred or 
where the plaintiff resides.75  The cause of action is litigated based on the substantive tort 
law of the state in which the alleged wrongful act occurred.76  Although most of the cases 
brought under the FTCA are founded in negligence, suit may also be brought for other 
tortious acts.77
The Complaint must name the United States as the defendant, and the only 
remedy available is money damages; the Act does not authorize equitable relief, punitive 
damages or prejudgment interest.78  The FTCA does not provide for jury trials,79 and 
attorney’s fees are limited to 20 percent of the amount recovered for an administrative 
72 FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE HANDBOOK, 2d ed. .  See also National Center on Poverty Law, 
Jeffery S, Gutman, ed., 2004 FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS; Comment, The Art 
of Claimsmanship: What Constitutes Sufficient Notice of a Claim Under the Federal Tort Claims Act?,  52 
U. CIN. L. REV. 149 (1983); Note, Claim Requirement of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Minimal Notice or 
Substantial Documentation?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1641 (1983); Note, Federal Tort Claims Act: Notice of 
Claim Requirements, 67 MINN. L. REV. 513 (1982); Note, Federal Tort Claims Act Administrative Claim 
Prerequisite, 1983 ARIZ. L. J. 173 (1983).
73
 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
74
 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
75
 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b).
76
 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
77
 For a list of these torts, see note 62, supra.
78
 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
79
 28 U.S.C. § 2402.
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settlement entered into with an agency and 25 percent of litigation settlements or 
judgments.80
As a defendant, the United States has available to it all of tort litigation defenses 
that a private party defendant would have under the same cause of action.  The United 
States may raise a defense of sovereign immunity in a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff 
has not complied with the administrative prerequisites to suit, described above.  In 
addition, the FTCA contains more than a dozen exceptions to its waiver of sovereign 
immunity, such as claims arising in a foreign country, claims based on the performance 
of a discretionary function and claims covered by certain other statues.81  Finally under 
the Feres doctrine82 the Supreme Court has held that the FTCA does not cover injuries to 
military personnel that occur in the course of military service.
Once a Complaint is filed, it must be served on the United States Attorney in the 
district under the provisions of Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
any local district rules.  A plaintiff must also send a copy of the Complaint by registered 
or certified mail to the Attorney General at the Department of Justice in Washington.83
After service, the suit is litigated as would be any federal civil action.
Although many plaintiffs rely on the FTCA to bring suit against the United States, 
practitioners should be aware that there are more than forty other federal statutes that 
afford administrative or judicial remedies for certain additional kinds of losses that result 
from government action.  These statutes include, for example, the Copyright 
Infringement Act, the Military and Foreign Claims Act and the Public Vessels Act.  Each 
80
 28 U.S.C. § 2678.
81
 28 U.S.C. § 2680.  
82 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
83 FEDERAL RULE OF CIV. PROC. 4(c) (2)(C)(II). 
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of these Acts sets out different kinds of claims covered, covered claimants, remedies 
available, proof required and administrative procedures.  Discussion of these other 
waivers of sovereign immunity is beyond the scope of this Article, but there are other 
comprehensive resources available to the practitioner. 84
B. (1) MARYLAND HAS WAIVED ITS COMMON LAW SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY THROUGH 
THE MARYLAND TORT CLAIMS ACT
History of the Maryland Tort Claims Act
The Maryland Tort Claims Act (MTCA)85 is the sole method for suing the State 
and its personnel in tort; it is a limited waiver of sovereign or governmental immunity. 
Under the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, the State and its agencies or 
units may be sued only with “specific legislative consent,”86 for the type of suit in 
question.87 Under Maryland law, even where a statute specifically waives immunity, a 
suit may only be brought where there are “funds available for the satisfaction of the 
judgment” or the agency has been given the power “for the raising of funds necessary to 
satisfy recovery against it.” 88
The MTCA provides a remedy for citizens who are injured by the negligent acts 
or omissions of State personnel acting within the scope of their public duties.  This 
limited waiver of sovereign immunity was the result of a compromise by the legislature 
in balancing conflicting interests: an interest in providing a remedy to injured persons 
84 See e.g., Lester Jayson and Robert C. Longstreth, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE 
& JUDICIAL REMEDIES §§1-21 (1964) (providing a comprehensive discussion of all compensatory remedies 
available against the government.); George Bermann, ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING OF MONETARY CLAIMS: 
TORT CLAIMS AT THE AGENCY LEVEL : FINAL REPORT (1984)
85 MD CODE ANN., State Gov’t.  §§ 12-101-12-110 (2005).
86 Dept. of Natural Resources v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54,  58-59 (1986).
87 Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n., 284 Md. 503 (1979).
88 University of Md. v. Maas, 173 Md. 554, 559 (1938); Board of Trustees of Howard Community College      
v. John K. Ruff Inc., 278 Md. 580, 590 (1976).
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while protecting the State’s fiscal reserves, and an interest in protecting State personnel 
from suit.89
When the General Assembly first waived sovereign immunity on July 1, 1982, it  
created a waiver of “the immunity of the State, of its units, and of State personnel, who 
are acting in official capacities as to six specified tort actions.”90  Thus, the General 
Assembly waived the sovereign immunity of the State in tort to a limited extent: for only 
six specific torts and only to the extent and amount of insurance coverage.91 Although 
the State employee who allegedly caused the harm could be sued, joinder of the State as a 
defendant was required if the plaintiff alleged that there was a “tortious act or omission 
committed within the scope” of the employee’s public duties. 92
In 1984, the General Assembly restructured the MTCA, adding a seventh specific 
tort,93  and, in 1985, it expanded the Act waiving State immunity, “as to a tort action,” 
generally.94  But it was not until 2003 that the Court of Appeals determined that this 
language included “constitutional torts” arising from alleged violations of the State 
constitution.95  The 1985 amendments also excluded from the waiver of immunity “acts 
89 See Report of the Governor’s Commission to Study Sovereign Immunity, Nov. 1976 (Mandel); Report of 
the Governor’s Commission to Study the Liability of Public Employees, Oct. 1978 (Blair).
90 See 1981 Md. Laws ch. 298; Kee v. State Highway Administration, 313 Md. 445, 448-49 (1988); State v. 
Card, 104 Md. App. 439, 446 (1995); Foor v. Juvenile Svcs. Admin., 78 Md. App. 151, 163 (1989).
91 MD CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc.,§ 5-403 (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.);  Kee, 313 Md. at 455; see also Board 
of Trustees of Howard Community College v. Ruff, 278 Md. 580 (1976) (holding that even with a waiver 
of sovereign immunity, an action for a money judgment may not be maintained unless funds have been 
appropriated for that purpose). 
92 MD CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc.,§ 5-404 (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.)  
93 See 1984 Md. Laws ch. 284, codified at MD. CODE ANN., State Gov’t Art.,§12-104, (1984 Vol.).  
94 See 1985 Md. Laws ch. 538, codified at MD CODE ANN., State Gov’t Art. § 12-104(a), (1989 Cum. 
Supp.); see Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md. 215, 219 (1991); Clea v. City of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, note 6 at 
671 (1988).
95 Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245 (2004).
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and omissions committed [by State personnel] with malice or gross negligence,” and 
designated that the entire Act be recodified in the State Government Article.96
Although the State waived its immunity more broadly, it did not waive its 
immunity for punitive damages, for interest before judgment, for claims arising from the 
combatant activities of the militia during a state of emergency, or for acts or omissions 
not within the scope of the public duties of the personnel, or for acts or omissions that are 
committed with malice or gross negligence. 97  Additionally, the State’s immunity is 
waived only for compensatory damages up to a maximum of $200,000 for each claimant 
for injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence. 98  In addition, before a claimant 
may file suit against the State, he must comply with certain notification procedures.  
Immunity of State Personnel
The General Assembly enacted important amendments to the MTCA in 1990 
concerning the immunity of State personnel.99  While the State waived its sovereign 
immunity for torts, it preserved it for State employees, substituting State government as 
the responsible party for torts committed by individual employees in certain 
circumstances. State employees and others designated as “State personnel” are immune 
from suit in courts of the State100 and from liability in tort for tortious acts or omissions 
96 Kee, 313 Md. at 333.
97 MD CODE ANN., State Gov’t. §§12-104(b), 12-105; MD CODE ANN. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(a)(l-3).
98MD CODE ANN., State Gov’t Art §12-104(a) (1-2); MD CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §5-522(a)(5); MD. 
REGS. CODE 25.02.02.02D.
99
 1990 Md. Laws, Ch. 508 (expanding the definition of “State personnel”). 
100
  Despite that the statute states that State personnel “are immune from suit in the courts of the State,” MD 
CODE ANN., State Gov’t, § 12-105 (b), the United States District Court for the District of Maryland has 
routinely applied the Act to its cases. See e.g., White v. Maryland Trans. Authority, et al., 151 F. Supp. 2d 
651, 657 (D. Md. 2001); but see Weller v. Dept. of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387, 397 (4th Cir. 1990); 
Johnson v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 757 F. Supp. 677 (D. Md. 1991).
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committed within the scope of their public duties, if the acts are made without malice or 
gross negligence. 101 In essence, the State’s employees continue to enjoy a form of 
sovereign immunity, and the State has waived its own immunity on their behalf.  
Accordingly, tort suits must name the State of Maryland as defendant, and not an 
individual employee.
Generally, members of State boards and commissions are protected under the 
MTCA from personal liability for damages and expenses arising out of their service 
absent a finding of gross negligence or willful misconduct.102  For that reason, the State 
Treasurer has not purchased additional coverage except and to the extent that the MTCA 
does not cover a potential claim.103
The statutory immunity provided by the MTCA is “qualified” and if a 
complainant alleges with specific facts that an employee acted with malice or gross 
negligence, the plaintiff may defeat the employee’s immunity.104  Such a suit must be 
brought against the employee personally because the State retains its sovereign immunity 
as to that cause of action. Full damages (including punitive damages) may be awarded 
only against the employee, and, accordingly, the MTCA damages limitation of $200, 000 
does not apply. 105
101 MD CODE ANN., State Gov’t §12-104(b); Cts. & Jud. Proc. §5-522 (a).
102 MD. CODE ANN., State Gov’t, §§ 12-l0l (a)(3)(i) and 12-105.
103 An example of such a claim would be a claim of securities fraud under the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934.   If the Treasurer did elect to purchase commercial coverage for an agency, the policy limits, terms 
and conditions of the commercial coverage will determine coverage and establish the limit of liability.  MD. 
REGS. CODE 25.02.02.01(B).
104 Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 163 (1999) (holding that unless plaintiff establishes actual malice or 
gross negligence, Ste employee is immune); Ford v. Baltimore City Sheriff’s Office, 149 Md. App. 107 
(2002) (holding that MTCA “clearly provides” that State employee acting within scope of employment is 
immune from suit). 
105 See Catterton v. Coale, 84 Md. App. 337(1990) cert. denied, 321 Md. 638 (1991); Shoemaker supra note 
104 at 158.
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Under the MTCA, the phrase “scope of public duties” is the equivalent with the 
common law concept of “scope of employment” – that is, whether the employee’s acts 
were authorized by the employer and were in furtherance of the employer’s business.106 If 
the employee’s conduct was based on personal intentions, was outrageous or 
unauthorized or at a time not usually considered a work period, the conduct may be 
beyond the scope of employment.107
“Malice” under the MTCA refers to the subjective state of mind of the tortfeasor, 
and is something beyond the merely reckless or wanton conduct that may be associated 
with gross negligence.  Under Maryland law “malice” is defined as “an act without legal 
justification or excuse, but with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate; the 
purpose being to deliberately and willfully injure the plaintiff.” 108 The plaintiff’s proof of 
malice “must point to specific evidence that the defendant’s actions were improperly 
motivated…sufficient to support a reasonable inference of ill will or improper motive.” 
109
 General, conclusory allegations will not satisfy this burden of proof.110
“Gross negligence” carries a similarly high standard of proof, being defined as an 
intentional failure to perform a duty in reckless disregard of the consequences of the life 
or property of another.111  Proof of gross negligence requires a showing of intentional 
106 Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 254 (1991).
107 Id. at 255-56; MD REGS. CODE 25.02.02.02.
108 Shoemaker, supra note 104 at 163, (quoting Leese v. Baltimore County, 64 Md. App. 422, 480 (1985)); 
Sawyer, supra note 106 at 261.  See also Foor, supra note 90 at 161;Wells v. State, 100 Md. App. 693 
(1994); Catterton, supra note105 at  95.
109 Thacker v. City of Hyattsville, 135 Md. App. 268, 301 (2000).
110 Foor, supra note 90 at 159; see also Eliot v. Kupferman, 58 Md. App. 510, 528 (1984) (requiring clear 
and precise facts of malice to defeat immunity).
111 Marriott Corp. v Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 124 Md. App. 463, 478 (1998) (quoting Romanesk v. 
Rose, 248 Md. 420, 423 (1968)).
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“wanton or reckless disregard for human life or the rights of others.”112  Accordingly, 
whether a State employee is deprived of his or her statutory immunity is evaluated from a 
subjective perspective, as it is the individual’s personal intentions that define whether he 
or she acted with malice or gross negligence.
Procedural Preconditions to Suit
As with the FTCA, the MCTA imposes another limitation Maryland’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity by requiring an administrative process as a prerequisite to filing suit.  
The MTCA establishes a comprehensive scheme setting forth specific procedural 
requirements that are preconditions to filing a suit against the State. If a plaintiff fails to 
fulfill these conditions, sovereign immunity is not waived and a court is without 
jurisdiction to hear the case. 
The Act sets forth as the primary precondition to suit against the State a notice 
provision: “A claimant may not institute an action under this subtitle unless: (1) the 
claimant submits a written claim to the Treasurer or designee of the Treasurer within one 
year after the injury to person or property that is the basis of the claim[.]” 113 The 
“discovery rule” that may be used to extend statutes of limitation in civil cases does not 
apply to this notice requirement, and the Court of Appeals has refused to recognize any 
“good cause” exception to the notice requirement.114
112 Foor, supra note 90 at 170; Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 580 (1991).
113 MD CODE ANN., State Gov’t § 12-106(b) (l). The “discovery rule” recognized to extend statutes of 
limitations in civil actions  
114 Simpson, supra note 94 at 224-25; Cotham and Maldando v. Board, 260 Md. 556 (1971); Trimper v. 
Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31 (1985).
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The Treasurer must deny the claim before suit may be filed.115 A “final denial” is 
either when (1) “. . .the Treasurer or designee sends the claimant, or the legal 
representative or counsel for the claimant written notice of denial; or (2) if the Treasurer 
or designee fails to give notice of a final decision within 6 months after the filing of the 
claim.”116  The MTCA’s statute of limitations is the same as the standard under State law 
and requires that a claimant file suit within three years after the cause of action arises.117
The claim must be in writing and state generally the basis of the claim. It should 
contain a statement of the underlying facts, including the date and place of the alleged 
tort, make a specific demand for damages, give the name and address of the potential 
parties and their counsel and be signed by the claimant, counsel or other legal 
representative.118  “Substantial compliance” with the requirement of section 12-107 is 
sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement with respect to content of the notice,119 but 
notice to the agency or to the Attorney General is not sufficient substantial compliance 
with the notice requirements.120
This advance notice allows the Treasurer to investigate the claim, to determine 
whether it is covered by a commercial policy or is a self-insured loss, to consult the 
Attorney General for a determination whether the Attorney General should represent the 
employee and/or defend the State, and to determine whether a claim should be settled and 
how much should be offered in settlement.  These procedural requirements were adopted 
115 MD CODE ANN., State Gov’t § 12-106(b) (2); Gardner v. State, 77 Md. App. 237, 247 (1988) (denial of 
claim by Treasurer is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit). 
116 MD CODE ANN., State Gov’t § 12-107(d) (l-2).  
117 Id. at § 12-106(b)(3).
118 MD CODE ANN., State Gov’t  § 12-107 (a).
119 Conaway v. State, 90 Md. App. 234, 242 (1992).  However, the doctrine of substantial compliance does 
not apply when no claim at all has been filed.  Johnson v. Maryland State Police, 331 Md. 285, 297 (1997).
120 Wimmer v. Richards, 75 Md. App. 102 (1988); MD REGS. CODE 25.02.03.01-03.
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to provide the State Treasurer’s Office with sufficient opportunity for an orderly 
consideration of the thousands of tort claims filed annually against the State.121
Once the Treasurer denies a claim, or it is deemed to have been denied,122 the 
claimant may file suit in the appropriate State court. Service must be made on the State 
Treasurer, and the Attorney General of Maryland defends the action on behalf of the 
State and any of its units.123
The State’s Insurance Program
The Treasurer is the primary procurement authority124 for obtaining insurance to 
covering the State’s liability risks,125 and categorizes claims in four basic categories. Real 
and personal property loss from fire, vandalism, storm damage, etc., is adjusted by the 
Insurance Division of the State Treasurer’s Office and is covered by self-insurance.126
Claims relating to specialty areas such as aviation hull coverage, rail car, boiler and large 
machinery, and port coverage are filed with the Insurance Division, but insured by 
specialty commercial coverage.   The third type of loss handled by the Insurance Division 
is claims for officers’ and employees’ liability, including awards made through the Board 
of Public Works.127 This category typically involves settlements or judgments against 
121 See Johnson supra note 119 at 295-96.
122 MD CODE ANN, State Gov’t § 12-107 (d)(2) (claim is “finally denied” if Treasurer fails to give notice of 
a final decision within 6 months of the filing of a claim).
123 MD CODE ANN, State Gov’t Art., § 12-108.
124 MD REGS. CODE 25.02.02.01A.
125 The University System of Maryland has independent authority to purchase insurance, MD. CODE ANN., 
Educ.  § 12-104(i)(2); and the Mass Transit Administration is self-insured for torts committed by its 
personnel. MD. CODE ANN. Transp. Art., § 7-702(b).
126 See MD. REGS. CODE 25.02.06.
127 MD. REGS. CODE 25.02.02.03A(4).
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State employees or officials for actions brought under federal statutes, for which they do 
not enjoy State statutory immunity. 128
General tort claims are the final category of risk handled by the Insurance 
Division and include premises liability, professional liability and other claims arising 
from services provided by the State.  Under this category, the State Treasurer also self-
insures for motor vehicle comprehensive and liability coverage, which includes both tort 
claims arising from the operation of motor vehicles by State personnel and claims for 
repair or replacement of State vehicles damaged in automobile accidents.129
The State Insurance Trust Fund
In every budget bill since the enactment of the MTCA, the General Assembly and 
the Governor have deposited funds into the State Insurance Trust Fund (SITF) for the 
State’s self-insurance reserve.  The SITF is comprised of General Fund and special fund 
appropriations in the State budget to the Treasurer, and of all agency premiums and 
reimbursements for losses paid. 130
The Treasurer is responsible for maintaining the solvency of the SITF and with 
setting agency premiums “so as to produce funds that approximate the payments from the 
128 Office of the Attorney General, MARYLAND TORT CLAIMS MANUAL at 7 (2d. ed., Nov. 2004),
[hereinafter CLAIMS MANUAL].
129 CLAIMS MANUAL at 14.
130 MD. CODE ANN., State Fin. & Proc. § 9-103(b)(2).  On a yearly basis, the Treasurer’s actuaries assess 
the SITF’s reserves and each agency’s loss for property damage, tort claims and constitutional claims.  The 
actuaries and the Insurance Divisions calculate a per capital rate for each person and vehicle assigned to 
each agency, which includes administrative expenses of the Insurance Division.  The agency’s loss history 
incurred since the previous budget cycle is added to the baseline rate and the losses are amortized over a 
five year period to compute the agency’s annual premium.  
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fund.” 131 Each State agency has an annual $1,000 deductible for each loss paid from the 
SITF which is paid from appropriations in the agency’s budget.132
Currently, and with only a few discreet exceptions, the State is self-insured for 
liability in tort.  Specifically, the Treasurer has been charged with providing sufficient 
self-insurance “...to cover the liability of the State, and its units and personnel under the 
Maryland Tort Claims Act.”133  The State’s tort liability under the MTCA is limited to 
$200,000 per claimant, and the Treasurer’s regulations provide that the State’s limit of 
liability is currently set at “$200,000 per claimant for all injury, loss, and damage to 
person or property arising from a single incident.” 134  The regulations also provide that 
“the sovereign immunity of the State is not waived for claims in excess of the 
limits....”135
Moreover, the Court of Appeals has explained that “[a legislative waiver of 
immunity is ineffective unless specific legislative authority to sue is given and unless 
there are funds available for the satisfaction of the judgment….”136
Discretionary Payment Provision
The MTCA does allow the Treasurer to make discretionary payments from the 
State Insurance Trust Fund in excess of $200,000 where a judgment or settlement has 
been entered granting the claimant damages to the full amount if the Board of Public 
Works has approved the supplement.137  However, although the discretionary payment 
131 MD CODE ANN., State Fin. & Proc. Art. § 9-106(b).  
132 MD CODE ANN., State Fin. & Proc. Art. § 9-107(c).
133 MD CODE ANN., State Fin. & Proc. § 9-105(c).  
134 MD CODE ANN., State Gov’t  § 12-104(a)(2); MD. REGS. CODE 25.02.02.02D(l); 
135 MD. REGS. CODE 25.02.02.02E
136 Katz, supra note 87 at 513.
137
 MD. CODE ANN., State Gov’t § 12-104(c) (1) (i-iii).  
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provision appears to provide broad authority for the Attorney General or the Treasurer to 
recommend that the Board of Public Works approve payments in excess of the limitation, 
in practical terms it does not.  First, budget bills since 1987 include restrictions that limit 
the Treasurer’s ability to settle and pay a tort judgment to the maximum amount.138
Second, the Treasurer’s own regulation allows her to recommend to the Board of Public 
Works only if the initial settlement or judgment is paid from commercial insurance and in 
the amount of the commercial insurance limits. 139 Since nearly all claims against the 
State are covered under the self-insurance program, almost none of the claims meet these 
requirements.  In fact, it appears that a discretionary payment in excess of $200,000 has
rarely, if ever been made.140
Multiple Claimants from Single Incident or Occurrence
The MTCA strictly limits the State’s liability for tort claims filed against the 
State, not exceed $200,000 to a single claimant for injuries arising from a single incident 
or occurrence.  Thus, the State’s sovereign immunity is only waived up to that monetary 
limit.141  The Treasurer’s regulations further provide that all persons claiming damages 
resulting from bodily injury to or the death of any one person shall be considered to be 
one claimant.142
The most common challenge to the single limitation provision arises in wrongful 
death/survival actions where there are often several statutory beneficiaries seeking 
138 CLAIMS MANUAL, at 39.
139 MD. REGS. CODE 25.02.02.03,
140 CLAIMS MANUAL, at 37.
141 MD. CODE ANN, State Gov’t § 12-104(a) (2), MD. CODE ANN.  Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(a)(5); MD. 
REGS. CODE 25.02.02.E; Gooslin v. State, 132 Md. App. 290 (2000) (holding that MTCA limitations on 
damages is not an unconstitutional restriction on the rights of injured persons to recover fair compensation).
142 MD. REGS. CODE 25.02.02.02 D(1)(a).  In addition, damage to or destruction of a single item of property 
shall be considered to be one claimant.  MD. REGS. CODE 25.02.02.02 D (1) (b). 
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recovery.143  Although there has been no appellate decision on the issue, numerous circuit 
courts have upheld the regulation from challenges that this provision is in derogation of 
the waiver of sovereign immunity under the MTCA.144 There are three primary reasons 
why the single cap recovery for wrongful death/survival is appropriate.  
First, the statute and the regulations clearly limit the State’s liability under the 
MTCA, based on the occurrence of bodily injury and not upon the number of claimants 
claiming derivative damages from that injury.  This view is consistent with the Court of 
Appeals’ interpretation of analogous commercial insurance bodily injury provisions.145
Second, the regulations were enacted pursuant to the broad authority granted the 
State Treasurer by the General Assembly, are neither inconsistent with the spirit of the 
law nor contradict its statutory language or purpose, and therefore, are valid.146
Third, and most importantly, every year since the enactment of the MTCA in 
1982, the General Assembly and the Governor have enacted a budget bill appropriating 
money for the State’s self-insurance reserves into the State Insurance Trust Fund. Every 
State budget enactment from 1982 to the present has adopted the single damages 
limitation or occurrence limit.  The language of the budget bills specifically state that 
payment of settlements and judgments under the MTCA must be made in accordance 
with the State Treasurer’s regulations.  Since the annual budget bill enactments provide 
that the monies appropriated by the General Assembly to the State Insurance Trust Fund 
143 MD CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc.,§ 3-901, et seq.
144 Interview with Laura C. McWeeney, Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Counsel to the State Treasurer,  
2003.
145 Daley v. United States Automobile Ass’n, 312 Md. 550 (1988); Surratt v. Prince George’s County, 320 
Md. 439 (1990) (only one bodily injury suffered); See also Igwilo v. Property & Casualty Ins. Guaranty 
Corp., 131 Md. App. 629 (2000)
146 See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Commission, 343 Md. 681, 687 (1996) (citing Christ v. Department of 
Natural Resources, 335 Md. 427, 437 (1994)).
28
are the only funds available to make payments under the MTCA, recovery in excess of 
$200,000 from the State Insurance Trust Fund or execution against other State assets for 
recovery in excess of the cap, is statutorily impermissible.147
Attorney’s Fees
Plaintiff’s counsel in cases brought pursuant to the MTCA “may not charge or 
receive” fees in excess of 20% of a settlement or 25% of a judgment obtained.148
Other Issues
A defendant may not immediately appeal a court order denying a sovereign 
immunity defense that may have been presented in a motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment. Such an order is not a final judgment on the merits of the litigation and 
therefore, the collateral order doctrine does not apply to allow for interlocutory appeal.149
However, if the defendant claims absolute, as opposed to qualified, immunity, a denial of 
that defense may be immediately appealed.150
A State agency may not waive sovereign immunity, either affirmatively or by 
failing to plead it as a defense,151 and the State may raise the defense for the first time on 
appeal.152
When the State of Maryland or its employees are sued in another state, the 
protections of the MTCA do not apply.  While the State may argue that the comity 
147 Board of Trustees of Howard County Community College v. Ruff, 278 Md. 580,  590 (1976).
148 MD CODE ANN., State Gov’t, § 12-109.
149 Shoemaker, supra note 104 at 169; State v. Jett, 316 Md. 248, 266 (1989).
150 Rice v. Dunn, 81 Md. App. 510, 536 (1990).
151 Dept. of Nat’l Res. v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 60 (1986).
152 Foor, supra note 90 at 160.
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doctrine153 allows for another state to recognize and apply the MCTA in its courts, the 
state has no obligation to do so. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States 
Constitution154 does not require that a state recognize another state’s laws granting itself 
and its agencies immunity from suit.155  However, the United States Supreme Court has 
noted that “[i]t may be wise policy, as a matter of harmonious interstate relations, for 
states to award each other immunity or to respect any established limits on liability.  They 
are free to do so.”156
B. (2) THE STATE OF MARYLAND HAS NOT WAIVED ITS ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
IMMUNITY
The State of Maryland is immune from suit in federal court by virtue of the 
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, unless the State has waived the 
immunity or Congress has overridden the immunity.157  The Supreme Court has held that 
“the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against 
nonconsenting States.”158 However, Congress does have the power to abrogate a State’s 
immunity based on its powers found in the United States Constitution: the commerce 
clause of Article I and §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.159  Congress has so acted in, for 
153
 “Comity” is viewed as deference to another state’s law where the situation involves an important matter 
of public policy and its application is not “obnoxious” to the forum state.  Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 
286 U.S. 145 (1929); Pacific Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493, 502-504 
(1939). 
154 U.S. CONST., art. 4, §1.
155 Kent County, State of Maryland v. Shepherd, 713 A.2d 290, 296-97(Del. 1998) (demonstrating the 
Court’s refusal to apply MTCA to case in which injury occurred in Delaware).
156 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979).  
157 Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
158 Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 744 (2003) (finding that Congress validly 
abrogated State immunity in passing the Family and Medical Leave Act).
159 Id. at 745.
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example, in enacting remedial statutes such as the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, 160 and the Americans With Disabilities Act.161
When the Eleventh Amendment applies, the State is immune regardless of the 
type of relief that is sought, be it monetary, injunctive or declaratory,162 and the State’s 
waiver of immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity 
in the federal courts.163  Indeed, a court may find that a State has waived its immunity in 
federal court “only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming 
implication…as to leave no room for any other construction.”164 A State’s immunity may 
be waived when the State elects to subject itself to the authority of the federal court by 
representing “in a judicial proceeding for the purpose of inducing the court to act or 
refrain from acting satisfies the [waiver] requirement.”165  For example, in Moreno v. 
University of Maryland166 the Fourth Circuit applied this principle when a State agency 
waived its immunity by obtaining from the federal court a stay of an injunction and 
represented to the Court that it would comply with the relief ordered if it lost its appeal of 
the injunction.  Additionally, if the State files a counterclaim to a federal suit, that action 
may be construed as a waiver of immunity.167  Contrariwise, the same court held that a 
State Assistant Attorney General does not have the authority to consent to a suit in 
160
 29 U.S.C. §621 et seq.
161
 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.
162 Corey v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91 (1982).
163 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99; Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-41 (1985); Weller, 
901 F.2d at 397-98.
164 Atascadero, supra note 163 at 239-40.
165 Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 1008 (1975).
166
 645 F.2d 217, 220 (1981), aff’d sub. nom.; Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
167 See Sue & Sam Manufacturing Co. v. B-L-S Construction Co., 538 F.2d 1048, 1067 (1976) (providing 
an analysis of factors to consider in determining immunity question).
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federal court which would otherwise be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.168
Moreover, because of the Eleventh Amendment, the State cannot be held liable for the 
alleged unconstitutional acts of its employees under 42 U.S.C. §1983 cases brought in 
federal court.169
C. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TORT CLAIMS ACT DOES NOT WAIVE THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY OF LOCAL ENTITIES
Tort claims and lawsuits brought against local governments are regulated by the 
Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA).170 Unlike the MTCA, the LGTCA does 
not waive sovereign immunity and “has nothing to do with a waiver of sovereign 
immunity.”171 Local governments have retained governmental immunity for the exercise 
of governmental functions,172 as is explained further below.
The LGTCA defines “local governments” in broad terms to include counties, 
municipalities and miscellaneous governmental entities such as the Washington Suburban 
Sanitary Commission, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commissions, 
public libraries, community colleges and others.173
Under the LGTCA the local government serves as an insurer who is required to 
defend and indemnify its employees for torts they commit within the scope of their 
employment.  The LGTCA protects the employees of local governments from 
168 Linkenhoker v. Weinberger, 529 F.2d 51, 54 (4th Cir. 1975).
169 Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). States are also not “persons” that are covered by the statute 
subjecting §1983 cases filed in State court against the State subject to dismissal on that basis.  See Will v. 
Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
170 MD CODE ANN., Cts & Jud. Proc., §§5-401, et seq.,(enacted by 1987 Laws of Maryland, Ch. 594). See 
Housing Authority of Baltimore City v. Bennett, 359 Md. 356, 357-58 (2000).
171 Williams v. Montgomery Co., 123 Md. App. 119, 129 (1998),
172 Pavelka supra note 181 v. Carter, 996 F.2d 645, 650 (4th Cir. 1993).
173 MD CODE ANN., Cts & Jud. Proc. §5-301(d).
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judgments.174 It does this in two ways: (1) the Act requires the local government to 
defend employees and (2) it requires the governments to pay all judgments and 
settlements, unless the employee acted with malice or gross negligence. 175 The LGTCA 
does not waive the governmental immunity of the local government;176  thus, the Act 
does not create liability on the part of the local government, but does create financial 
responsibility for the government for the non-malicious acts of its employees.177
Accordingly, a plaintiff must sue an employee, but execute any judgment 
obtained against the local government.178  A suit that names only the governmental entity 
is defective and subject to a motion to dismiss; one may not sue the local government 
directly.179 Additionally, although the suit is brought against the employee, one may not 
execute a judgment against the employee absent proof of actual malice. Concomitantly, 
the local government is obligated to defend its employee if he or she acted within the 
scope of employment and must indemnify the employee if a judgment is returned against 
him or her.180
The LGTCA permits the government employer, in defending the employee, to 
raise any defenses or immunities held by the employee, “even where those defenses or 
immunities could not have been vicariously asserted by the employer to bar respondeat 
superior at common law.”181  Accordingly, even though the local government, as 
174 Id..
175 Id. at §5-302.
176 Williams v. Prince George’s County, 157 F.Supp.2d 596 (D. Md. 2001); Dawson v. Prince George’s 
County, 896 F. Supp. 537 (D. Md. 1995); Williams v. Prince George’s County, 112 Md. App. 526, 552-53 
(1996).
177 Khawaja v. City of Rockville, 89 Md. App. 314 (1991); Dawson , supra note 176 at 539.
178 Martino supra note 178 at 722; Ennis v. Crenca, 322 Md. 285, (1991).
179 Id. at 723; Williams, supra note 171 at 129.
180 Id. at 126.
181 Pavelka supra note 181 at 648.
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employer, is not liable in tort actions for the tortious conduct of its employees under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior,182 it may assert the individual’s potential defenses on the 
employee’s behalf.
The procedural provisions of the LGTCA apply to “all torts without distinction, 
including intentional and constitutional torts,”183 and any judgment arising from such 
claims must be paid by the municipality, not the individual defendants.184
Governmental Functions versus Proprietary Functions
The sovereign immunity of the State extends to its agencies, “but not to its 
creatures, such as municipal corporations, except when [they are] exercising some 
governmental function of the state itself.”185 Until the early twentieth century “local 
governments generally had no immunity under Maryland common law in either tort or 
contract actions.”186 But the Court of Appeals extended the State’s sovereign immunity to 
municipalities when their employees perform “purely governmental function(s)”187 and 
thus are acting as an extension of the State itself.  In this context, the immunity is more 
properly identified as “governmental” rather than “sovereign,”188 and the immunity is 
limited to tortious conduct that occurs “in the exercise of a ‘governmental’ rather than 
182 Martino supra note 178 at 721; Austin supra note 182 at 53.
183
 Thomas v. City of Annapolis, 113 Md. App. 440, 456 (1997).
184
 Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70,(1995).
185
 Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v. State, for use of Blueford, 173 Md. 267, 271 (1937).
186 Bennett supra note 170, at 358; Austin supra note 182 supra note 182 at 70-71 (1979); Whalen  supra 
note 6 at 308-309.
187
 Town of Brunswick v. Hyatt, 91 Md. App. 555, 559 (1991).
188
 Heffner v. Montgomery County, 76 Md. App. 328, 333, n. 4 (1988) (“Traditionally, sovereign immunity 
was the term used to describe that immunity enjoyed by the State while governmental  immunity was the 
term used to refer to the immunity enjoyed by a county or municipality.”); Austin supra note 182 at 53.
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‘proprietary’ function.” 189 The immunity afforded to local governments is considered to 
be “much narrower that the immunity of the State.”190
Local governments, then, have common law immunity only for acts that are 
governmental, not for acts that are proprietary or private, and “they do not have immunity 
from liability for State constitutional torts.”191
Thus the law related to the immunity of local governments depends on this 
distinction, one that “is sometimes illusory in practice.”192  In 1937 the Court of Appeals 
offered a test to assist parties in determining whether a function was governmental or 
proprietary,193 which it later simplified to be: “[w]hether the act performed is for the 
common good of all or for the special benefit or profit of the corporate entity.”194
For historical reasons that are not well documented or articulated, it is “long 
settled law” in Maryland that a municipality has a “private proprietary obligation” to 
maintain, in a reasonably safe condition, its streets, sidewalks, and areas contiguous to 
them.  Therefore, a municipality is not immune from a negligence action arising out of its 
maintenance of its public streets and highways,195 even though the building and 
maintenance of public streets and sidewalks is primarily for the public benefit and 
promotes public safety and welfare.  Although there is little evidence that any 
189 Id. 
190
 Bd. of Educ. Of Prince George’s County v. Mayor & Common Council of the Town of Riverdale , 320 
Md. 384, 390 (1990).
191
 Balt. Police Dept. v. Cherkes, 140 Md. App. 282, 314 (2001).
192
 E. Eyeing Co. v. City of Baltimore, 253 Md. 380, 382 (1969).
193 Blueford supra note 185 at 276 (holding that “Where the act in question is sanctioned by legislative 
authority, is solely for the public benefit, with no profit or emolument inuring to the municipality, and tends 
to benefit the public health and promote the welfare of the whole public, and has in it no element of private 
interest, it is governmental in nature.”)
194
 Tadjer v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 539, 547 (1984).
195 Whalen supra note 6 at 312.  Since this Court decided Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Eagers, 
167 Md. 128 (1934), a municipality’s proprietary duty “to keep streets safe for travel” has extended also “to 
the land immediately contiguous to these public ways.” Id. at 136.
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municipality incurs a profit or compensation for road building, governmental immunity is 
not available to local governments for this function.196
But most other local government activities are considered to be governmental.  
For example, the operation and maintenance of a public park is unquestionably a 
governmental function,197 as well as the operation of a day camp,198a town pool,199 a 
police force,200 a courthouse,201 and a transportation service.202
This rather antiquarian notion of the governmental/proprietary distinction has 
been criticized as being illogical and cumbersome.  In 1979, Judge Cole of the Maryland 
Court of Appeals noted “the unsoundness of the governmental-proprietary distinction,”203
a sentiment echoed by Judge Eldridge.204  Judge Eldridge made the point again in 1984, 
stating “that the governmental-proprietary distinction is an irrational basis for 
determining whether local governments may be held liable in tort.  The governmental-
proprietary distinction, which has never been expressly sanctioned by the Maryland 
Legislature, was adopted by the Court relatively recently in history and with little 
reasoning.  The distinction has proven to be unsound, and it should be abandoned.”205 His 
view is that the concept suffers from the fact that this Court has not been able to arrive at 
196 Kranz, supra note 1 at 622.
197 Whalen, supra note 6, 164 Md. App. at 310.
198 Austin, supra note 182, 286 Md. at 55. 
199 Hyatt, supra note 187 at 558.
200 Williams, supra note 176 at 544.
201
 Harford County v. Love, 172 Md. 429, 433 (1938).
202 Pavelka, supra note 181 at 649; but see Anne Arundel County, Maryalnd v. McCormick, 323 Md. 699, 
696 (1991) (purchase of self-insurance for workers’ compensation liability is proprietary function).
203 Austin, supra note 182 at 83 (Cole, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 67 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205 Tadjer, supra note 193 at 554-55 (1984) (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Judge 
Eldridge’s view implies that the distinction should be eliminated and that the government’s immunity 
remains intact, not that the immunity be abrogated. 
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a satisfactory definition for the distinction, and consequently, as a test for liability, it is 
“unsatisfactory and illogical.”206
It appears that this “illogical exception to the rule” of governmental immunity is 
“too well settled….to now be questioned or discussed;”207 it “seems destined to remain 
with us for the foreseeable future.”208
Limitation on Recovery
Recovery under the LGTCA is limited to $200,000 per individual claim and 
$500,000 per total claims arising from a single incident, regardless of number of 
claimants. 209  There is no Maryland appellate case that has addressed this issue in a death 
case under either the LGTCA or the Maryland State Tort Claims Act. 
Interpretation of these statutory limitations is analogous to the insurance 
limitations in the private sector.  The limitation terms of both the MTCA and the LGTCA 
represent a per person policy limit, and because in any given death case only one person, 
the decedent suffers bodily injury, his beneficiaries are entitled to make only one claim.  
Consequential damages are computed as part of the single bodily injury claim of which 
they are a consequence, and do not represent a separate claim. 210
The LGTCA states “the liability of a local government may not exceed $200,000 
per an individual claim.”211 This language contemplates an individual bodily injury.  
Indeed, this limitation is usually reflected in a County’s insurance policy because that is 
the full extent of a County’s potential exposure by operation of law.  
206 Austin, supra note 182 at 72 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
207 Blueford, supra note 185 at 273.
208
 Higgins v. City of Rockville, 86 Md. App. 670, 678, cert. denied, 323 Md. 309 (1991).
209 MD CODE ANN., Cts & Jud. Proc.,§5-303(a)(1).
210 Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Scherr, et al., 101 Md. App. 690, 697 (1994).
211 MD CODE ANN., Cts & Jud. Proc.,§5-303(a).
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Notice Requirements
Section 5-304 of the LGTCA requires that a claimant give notice of a claim 
within 180 days of injury.  The statute designates which individual in various counties is 
the proper recipient of the claim.212  However, a claimant may be entitled to file suit 
without giving the proper notice because the statue includes a Waiver of Notice 
provision.  Under this provision, a defendant must show that it was prejudiced by the lack 
of notice, providing the plaintiff shows good cause why the notice was not filed. 213
Local Government Insurance
The Local Government Insurance Trust (LGIT) is a non-profit insurance group 
that pools insurance premiums for many Maryland local governments, including counties 
and local entities.  It provides coverage for general liability, employee liability, 
automobile liability and property.214  Some local governments are self-insured rather than 
by LGIT.   
D. TRANSPORTATION ARTICLE WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
The enactment by the General Assembly of Transportation Article, §17-107 (c)
prohibits both State and local governments from asserting sovereign immunity “with 
respect to the security that state law requires all vehicle owners….including 
governmental one, to post.”215 Section 17 requires vehicle owners, including the 
government, to carry minimal insurance coverage.  Sub-section 17-107 prohibits two 
things: drivers may not drive cars they know are uninsured, and owners may not permit 
212 Id. at §5- 304 ..
213
 Id. at § 5-304. 
214 Local Government Insurance Trust website, available at http://www.lgit.org. (last visited on April 13, 
2006).
215 Pavelka, supra note 181 at 649.
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their uninsured vehicles to be driven216; and no owner of a motor vehicle “may raise the 
defense of sovereign or governmental immunity….in any judicial proceeding” in which it 
is claimed that personal injury or property damage was “caused by the negligent use of 
[a] motor vehicle while in government service or performing a task of benefit to the 
government.”217
If suit is filed under this section, the maximum recovery available is $20,000 
person, per motor vehicle accident ($40,000 total) and $15,000 in total property 
damage.218  Suits may be filed under this section without making any notice claim to the 
liable governmental entity.219
This provision prevents Maryland’s governmental entities from asserting  
sovereign immunity and thus be excused  from insuring their vehicles, and insures that
motorists benefit from the protections and potential recovery that the sub-title 17 is 
intended to provide.  For these purposes, sub-section (b) “puts governmental vehicle 
owners…in the same position as private owners…”220
The legislature intended to provide to citizens minimal recovery for injuries 
resulting from the negligence of governmental drivers.  It is the owner of the motor 
vehicle that is forbidden from raising the defense of sovereign or governmental 
immunity, not the employee-driver.  Local government employees do not enjoy common 
law immunity for their negligent driving acts, but are entitled to indemnification from the 
216 MD. CODE ANN., Transp. I, §7-107(a).
217 MD. CODE ANN., Transp. I §7-107(b); Cts. & Jud. Proc., §5-524.
218 MD. CODE ANN., Transp. II §17-103 (b).
219 Pavelka, supra note 181 at 649.
220 Id. at 650.
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local government employer pursuant to the LGTCA.221 State employees who drive 
negligently may assert the immunity provided by statute.222
Operators of emergency vehicles are immune from suit in their individual 
capacity from negligent acts or omissions committed while operating the emergency 
vehicle “in the performance of emergency service” but the owner is liable for resultant 
damages under the terms of §17-103.223
In order to take advantage of the “more expansive waiver of immunity” provided 
by the MTCA224 an injured motorist must comply with the notice provisions of the 
MTCA.  Compliance with the notice provisions of the LGTCA, on the other hand, does 
not expand the waiver of the immunity enjoyed by a county, since the LGTCA does not 
waive immunity to begin with.225
E. STATE LAW PROVIDES OTHER IMMUNITY FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Similarly to the U.S. Code, the Annotated Code of Maryland contains various 
other immunities for government employees and officials scattered throughout.  For 
example, the Courts & Judicial  Proceedings Article, Title 5, Subtitle 5, entitled
“Immunities and Prohibited Actions – Governmental” provides numerous other specific 
forms of immunity.  Here we find such items as immunity for the Department of Liquor 
Control for Montgomery County,226 for members of military courts,227 and county boards 
221 Id. at 650; .MD. CODE ANN., Cts & Jud. Proc.§5-302.
222 MD. CODE ANN., Cts & Jud. Proc., §5-522(b). 
223 MD. CODE ANN., Cts & Jud. Proc., §5-639.
224
 Maryland v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 38 (1992).
225 Pavelka, supra note 181 at 649.
226 MD CODE ANN., Cts & Jud. Proc., §5-504.
227 Id., §5-513.
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of education.228  And other code sections may overlap; for instance the Education Article 
provides sovereign immunity for “a county board of education” 229 and for county board 
employees.230 Accordingly, practitioners must search the Code when bringing or 
defending tort suits to insure that he or she considers the impact of every applicable 
section on the litigation.
Additionally, government employees in Maryland may frequently be entitled to 
assert common law “public official” immunity from negligence torts extending beyond 
the governmental entity itself when they exercise discretionary functions.231  The 
functions of most high ranking government officials and all police officers are 
discretionary.232  But employees who perform “ministerial” functions, and who are not 
considered “public officials” are not entitled to this immunity.233 Thus, for a defendant to 
establish that he is entitled to the defense of public official immunity, he must show that: 
(1) he is a public official, (2) the conduct complained of was discretionary in nature and 
(3) the act(s) he performed were within the scope of his official duties.234 Officials of 
“governmental entities”235 have a similar defense established by statute.236
228 Id., §5-518.
229 MD CODE ANN., Educ. Art., §4-105.
230 Id. at §4-106.
231 Pavelka supra note 181 at 649; Thomas, supra note 183 at 452.
232 Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294, 302 (1979), overruled on other grounds, 323 Md. 
558 (1991).
233 Pavelka, supra note 181 at 649 (citing example of a bus driver as an employee who performs 
ministerial functions).
234 Thomas, supra note 183 at 452.
235 See MD CODE ANN., Art. 26, §1(b) for definition of “governmental entity.” 
236 Id. at Art. 26, §§ 2, 3; MD CODE ANN., Cts & Jud. Proc., §5-511.
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Like State statutory immunity, public official immunity is qualified, that is, it only 
provides a shield from liability as long as the official acted without malice or gross 
negligence.237
F. FEDERAL COMMON LAW PROVIDES QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR STATE 
GOVERNMENT ACTORS ALLEGED TO HAVE COMMITTED VIOLATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
A federal statue, 42 U.S.C. §1983, a statute authorizes suits against state and local 
officials and local government (in certain cases) for violations of federal constitutional 
and statutory rights.  The statute reads:
Every person who, under color of any statue, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 allows a person to make a claim for relief against a government official 
who, acting under of state law, violated the person’s federal constitutional or statutory 
rights. To state a claim, the “plaintiff must allege (1) a deprivation of federal right and (2) 
that the person who deprived him of that right acted under color of state law.”238 More 
specifically, a plaintiff must plead and prove four elements:
1. conduct by a “person;”239
2. who acted under “color of law;”
3. that proximately caused;
4. a deprivation of federally protected rights.240
237 Biser v. Deibel, 128 Md. App. 670, 681 (1999), cert. denied, 357 Md. 482 (2000). 
238
 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
239
 The word “person” under §1983 does not include a state agency, or a state official sued in an official 
capacity. Will v. Michigan State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). However, municipalities and municipal 
officials sued in either an official or personal capacity are “persons” under §1983. Monnell v. Dept. of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (noting that local governments have historically enjoyed less 
immunity protection than other sovereigns.) 
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A wide range of federal constitutional and federal statutory rights may be 
enforced through §1983 suits,241 and §1983 applies to the states by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Because §1983 itself does not create federally protected rights, 
a complainant must allege the constitutional or federal statutory basis for his or her 
claim.242 Indeed, the Supreme Court in §1983 cases requires that judicial analysis “begin 
by identifying the specific constitutional [or statutory] right allegedly infringed by the 
challenged [conduct].”243
While §1983 is a powerful tool for plaintiffs to use in suing governmental agents 
in Maryland, its application is tempered by well-established defenses. In addition to the 
usual defenses available in tort cases, §1983 defendants are entitled to assert common law 
defenses of absolute or qualified immunity. Judges, prosecutors, witnesses and legislators 
are generally entitled to assert absolute immunity; executive and administrative officials 
may assert qualified immunity.244
The State of Maryland cannot be sued under §1983 because it is not a “person” 
and because it is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See section B.2 above. However, 
a municipal government may be liable under §1983 if a plaintiff alleges and can prove 
240 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, 21ST ANNUAL SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION, Vol. 1 at 45 (2004).
241 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, Ch. 2 (4th ed. 2003).
242 See e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (claims for violation of fourth amendment); Dennis v.
Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991) (claim for violation of dormant commerce clause); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 
U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (must allege violation of a federal right, not just violation of federal law); Maine v. 
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (wide array of federal statutory rights enforceable under §1983).
243
 Graham v. Connor,, 490 U.S. at 394. Note also that violations of state law are not enforceable under 
§1983. See e.g., Baker v. McCollum, 443 U.S. 137, 149 (1979). However, state courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over §1983 claims.  Nat’l Private Truck Council v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582 
(1995), and state court defendants sued under §1983 may remove the case to federal court. 28 U.S.C. §1441 
(a) and (b). 
244 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECTION 1983 LITIGATION at 67 (2004).  For an interesting 
discussion about the disjointed manner in which the Supreme Court has developed §1983 immunity 
principles, see George Berman, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 With Special Attention to Sources of 
Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 66-70 (November 1989).
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that the unconstitutional action he complains of “resulted from a County policy, practice 
or custom.”245  Such proof must ordinarily consist of evidence that a local government 
operates according to a policy statement, ordinance or regulation that “is both fairly 
attributable to the municipality as its own and is the moving force behind the specific 
constitutional violation.”246  When a municipal policy is itself unconstitutional because it 
directs or authorizes employees to commit constitutional violations, a plaintiff is not 
required to also show that the policy caused his or her constitutional injury.247
A judicially created creature, the qualified immunity defense involves the 
balancing of an individual’s right to vindicate his or her federal rights with the social 
need to allow officials to exercise discretion and perform their duties without 
apprehension of liability. One commentator asserts that” [q]ualified immunity may well 
be the most important issue in §1983 litigation,” and notes that many §1983 cases are 
disposed of in favor of defendants based on the qualified immunity defense.248
Qualified immunity is not only immunity from liability, but also from suit itself 
and from “the burdens of having to defend the litigation.”249 A form of common law 
immunity, the Supreme Court determined in 1982 that qualified immunity should be 
available to §1983 defendants whose actions, even if unconstitutional, were objectively 
reasonable.250   These cases often arise in the context of law enforcement activity. An 
example is one in which police officers discovered a suspect hiding in a dark closet hold 
a long metal object, and shot the suspect.  They were entitled to qualified immunity from 
245 Monnell v. Dep’t of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
246 Williams, supra note 176 at 601, (citing Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (4th Cir. 1987)). 
247 Monnell, supra note 245 at 661.
248 SCHWARTZ, supra note 240, at 70.
249 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
250 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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suit for shooting the suspect because their belief that he had a shotgun was objectively 
reasonable.  In reality, the suspect was holding a vacuum cleaner hose.251
Whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity is a legal question to be 
decided by the court, and is often presented in a motion for summary judgment. In 
analyzing whether the defense is available, the court must engage in a two-step analysis. 
The court must first determine if the Complaint states a violation of federally protected 
rights. If there has been no violation, the Complaint fails to state a claim and the 
application of the immunity defense is essentially unnecessary.252 The court should 
dismiss the claim on a defense motion.  Even if the defendant official did violate the 
plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory rights, he is still entitled to immunity if his actions 
were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.253
One indicia of the objective reasonableness is whether the law that the official 
allegedly violated was “clearly established” at the time of the events underlying claim. 
This is known as the “fair warning” test, to insure that the official was on notice of the 
state of the law so as to realize whether he violated the law.254 Further, the defendant’s 
subjective motivation behind his actions is irrelevant to the defense because the immunity 
is evaluated on an objective basis, even though the court’s inquiry is fact-specific.  
Because qualified immunity is immunity from suit, a §1983 defendant may immediately 
appeal a pre-trial denial of a motion asserting the defense.255
251 Greenidge v. Ruffin,  927 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1991).
252 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, (2002).
253 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2003).
254 JOHN E. NOWAK AND RONALD D. ROTUNDA , TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND 
PROCEDURE at 86 (1983).
255 Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996).
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In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,256 the Supreme Court explained that it assumed that the 
42nd Congress was aware of and intended for common law tort immunities to apply to 
§1983 actions, as they are procedurally treated as involving claims for personal injury 
and are thus referred to as “constitutional torts.”257 The Court has developed a functional 
approach to immunity. An immunity defense is available if the official would have been 
immune from tort liability in 1867 and if that immunity is consistent with the policy goals 
underlying §1983.258
Section 1983 suits create significant social costs to the benefit of individuals. A 
large number of these suits are filed, creating a strain of the judicial system. The cases are 
expensive to litigate and those expenses are often borne by the state and local 
governments. Requiring public officials to participate in the litigation diverts them from 
their official functions and the threat of suit may intimidate them in performing those 
public duties. Finally, without qualified immunity individuals would be reluctant to serve 
in public employment.
Thus, when a state actor has committed a constitutional violation, she is protected 
by qualified immunity so long as she acted reasonably, even if mistakenly.259  Some 
commentators have asserted that this principle seriously limits the success that § 1983 
plaintiffs may realize and may not have a legitimate, historical place in § 1983 
litigation.260
256
 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
257 NOWAK AND ROTUNDA, supra note 254 , at 106.  See also, Barbara Kritchevsky, Is There a Cost 
Defense?  Budgetary Constraints as a Defense in Civil Rights Litigation, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 483 (2004).
258 NOWAK AND ROTUNDA, supra note 254 at 86.
259 Saucier, supra note 253 at 205-06; Waterman et al. v. Batton, et al., 393 F.3d 471, 477 (4th Cir. 2005).
260
 David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the 
Restriction of Constitutional Rights 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 27 (Nov. 1989) (qualified immunity limits 
(continued…)
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Relatively modern principles of tort law seem to underlie the Court’s extensive 
application of the qualified immunity defense.261  The line of cases that has created a 
“pure federal law of immunities”262 has made it more difficult for civil rights plaintiffs to 
recover damages.  Qualified immunity has been criticized, not only for “limiting official 
accountability for unconstitutional conduct,”263 but also for limiting the remedial 
purposes of §1983 and changing substantive constitutional law.
PART III – CONCLUSION 
Sovereign immunity has been described as “so complex” in its “legal 
idiosyncrasies.”264  The FTCA is referred to as “a statute of unique complexity”265 while 
the MTCA has its own special quirks.  The waiver of sovereign immunity found in the 
MTCA is not found in the LGTCA.  The immunity to which federal, State and local 
employees is entitled varies not only with their employment status, but with their 
particular function, the cause of action alleged and the legal standard of view used to 
analyze their conduct.
A recent simple automobile tort case illustrates these complications.  Plaintiff was 
involved in a minor motor vehicle accident with a County Deputy Sheriff in a county in 
which the Sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer; there is no county police 
department. Prior to filing suit, plaintiff makes a claim pursuant to the LGTCA, 
individual liability for constitutional violations by denying a damage remedy for conduct that violates the 
Constitution).
261
 Beerman, supra note 244, at 67.
262 Id. Beerman criticizes the court for “making policy with development and application of qualified 
immunity.
263
 Rudovsky, supra note 175 at 27; Beerman, supra note 244, at 35-36 (“Qualified immunity has emerged 
as one of the most significant and problematic defenses to claims of civil rights violations”).
264
 Boger et al, supra note 9, at 507.
265 Id. at 533; see also Santoro, supra note 52 at 224 (certain peculiarities of the FTCA “can make litigating 
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addressed to the County Attorney. The County Attorney informs her that Deputy Sheriffs 
are State constitutional officers and thus State employees, and that she must satisfy the 
prerequisites of the MTCA before filing suit.
Plaintiff makes a claim to the State Treasurer, pursuant to the MTCA.  The 
Insurance Division of the State Treasurer’s Office denies the claim, noting that when 
performing law enforcement functions, as opposed to “traditional” Sheriff’s Office 
duties, deputy sheriffs are insured by the county in which they work, although are State 
employees for purposes of MTCA statutory immunity. The Treasurer refers plaintiff back 
to the county, who makes another LGTCA claim to the county.
The county denies the claim, and plaintiff files a negligence suit in the District 
Court of Maryland, naming the county as defendant.  The county moves to dismiss, 
arguing that the county is immune from suit for the governmental function of law 
enforcement, and that only an employee can be sued.  Plaintiff re-files the suit, naming 
the individual deputy sheriff as defendant.
The deputy sheriff moves to dismiss based on public official and MTCA 
immunity for State personnel, and prevails.  If the statue of limitations has not run out, 
the plaintiff re-files her suit against the State of Maryland, the employer of State 
personnel. If she gets a judgment in her favor, she will have to determine whether to 
execute that judgment against the SITF or the county which must indemnify its 
employees.
“Immunity…. plays a vital role in our system; it is not so much a barrier to 
individual rights as it is a structural protection for democratic rule.”266 But if attorneys do 
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not understand the intricacies of this area of the law, and do not understand how to use 
the principles to prosecute or defend civil litigation against the government, individual 
rights may be compromised, as well as the effective functioning of the government itself.  
Statutory and common law has, for the most part, struck an appropriate balance between 
the two, a balance that is fascinating in its delicacy.
